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An investigation of the new statutory standards of conduct relating to accidents involving horses and
other equids highlights current issues concerning tort liability.  After a summary of existing Georgia
Good Samaritan statutes and liability exceptions, part II evaluates the provisions on standards of
conduct to show how the statute changes existing law.  In part III, two legislative proposals are
offered to encourage safer equine activities: (1) an amendment of the statutory provisions on
warnings, and (2) adopting new provisions requiring helmets for minors.  Through these proposed
amendments, the statutory dispensation for equine owners and operators could be based on safety
prerequisites. 
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I.  Introduction
In enacting the provisions regarding “Injuries from Equine Activities,”  the Georgia
1
General Assembly has created a new Good Samaritan paradigm for conduct involving horses,
other equids, and llamas.   The provisions, called the equine statute, provide immunity to animal
2
owners and additional qualifying persons  and change longstanding negligence rules regarding
3
some conduct by animal business owners.  Similar proposed legislation would cover cows,  and
4
legislatures have enacted equine statutes in thirty-four states.   The expansion of tort liability,
5
increases in insurance costs, and the dangerousness of activities involving animals are unique
factors that seem to have persuaded the General Assembly to modify tort liability.
Classic Good Samaritan statutes provide immunity to qualifying doctors and others who
render voluntary assistance.   Negligence exceptions for charitable and philanthropic activities
6
now exist for an extensive array of Good Samaritans.   These include persons assisting a human
7
who is choking,  licensees providing ambulance service,  law enforcement officers,  participants
8       9      10
in 911 emergency service,  voluntary health care providers,  persons providing services in
11       12
conjunction with catastrophic acts of nature,  agents fighting fires,  drivers of fire apparatus,
13     14       15
drug abuse instructors,  persons donating services to schools,  donees of food,  employees of
16        17     18
compressed gas dealers assisting a law enforcement agency,  and operators of vessels rendering
19
assistance to persons affected by a casualty.   
202
A preexisting duty to assist or remuneration often serves to disqualify Good Samaritans or
other individuals from the statutory immunity.  Some statutes delineate a prerequisite of good
faith.  Enumerated standards of gross negligence or willful misconduct that may not be exceeded
also serve as qualifications under individual Good Samaritan statutes.
A modification of the Good Samaritan immunity was developed for recreational land
owners “to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public for
recreational purposes. . . .”   In Georgia, these provisions are known as the Georgia Recreational
21
Property Act.   An owner of land does not owe a duty of care to persons who enter the land for
22
recreational purposes, although exceptions exist.  Owners that charge fees for recreational
activities may not qualify,  and owners remain liable “[f]or willful or malicious failure to guard or
23
warn against a dangerous condition . . . or activity. . . .”
24
While the coverage of the state equine liability statutes has been addressed, its coverage of
non-charitable activities is quite different from most of the Good Samaritan statutes.  Recently,
additional statutory exceptions for sport activities  and pick-your-own fruit and vegetable
25
business operations  have secured special dispensation for qualifying persons in some states. 
26
Although the vicissitudes of tort liability with respect to animal activities may justify special
dispensation, perhaps the immunity should be accompanied by provisions that would augment the
safety of participants in equine activities.  This article commences with an analysis of the immunity
provided by the statutory general standard of conduct.  Next, the article examines a special
standard of reasonable and prudent efforts for persons providing suitable animals and the change
in liability to articulate the coverage of the equine statute.  Two ideas for safety prerequisites3
involving equestrian helmets are proposed as vehicles to complement the new legislative directives
concerning safer equine activities.
II.  Immunity Under Statutory Provisions Regarding Standards of Conduct
The statutory directive of the equine statute provides that qualifying persons “shall not be
liable for an injury to or the death of a participant resulting from the inherent risks of equine
activities . . . ” except as provided under enumerated exceptions.   Inherent risks are dangers or
27
conditions that are an integral part of equine activities.   Under the statutory command, inherent
28
risks include equine behavior, unpredictability of reactions, hazards such as surface and subsurface
conditions, collisions with other equines and objects, and a participant's negligence or failure to
maintain control over an animal. 
A.  The General Standard
After the statutory grant of immunity, the equine statute enumerates five major exceptions
that establish standards of conduct that cannot be exceeded.   As a general standard, anyone who
29
“[c]ommits an act or omission that constitutes willful or wanton disregard for the safety of a
participant, and that act or omission caused the injury . . .” is not entitled to statutory immunity.  
30
This excuses gross negligence relating to injuries resulting from the inherent risks of equine
activities, a standard that is similar to several other Georgia Good Samaritan provisions.  Other
exceptions of the equine statute prescribe different standards so that persons providing equipment
or animals may be liable for negligence in selected situations.4
The meaning of the general standard of conduct under the equine statute was recently
considered by the Georgia Court of Appeals in Muller v. English.   An experienced horsewoman
31
was injured when defendant Muller’s horse “suddenly and without warning kicked her in the
leg.”   The plaintiff claimed that the horse was a habitual kicker and should have been marked
32
with a red ribbon in the tail to denote an irritable horse.  Additional allegations stated that
Muller’s horse was vicious with a known propensity to kick, which established a willful or wanton
disregard for the plaintiff’s safety.
The defendants moved for summary judgment based on the provisions of the Georgia
equine statute.  Defendants argued that, given the facts, the immunity provided by subsection 4-
12-3(a) meant there could be no liability.  The appellate court agreed, but the court considered the
issue of whether the plaintiff’s allegations could establish liability under the general standard.  This
question concerned whether defendant Muller committed an act or omission that constituted
willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the plaintiff.  Case law interpretations of other
statutes and common law revealed that willful conduct requires actual intent to do harm or inflict
injury.  To show wanton conduct, the conduct needs to be “so reckless or so charged with
indifference to the consequences as to be equivalent in spirit to actual intent.”  The Muller
plaintiff’s experience with horses and the nature of the equine activity meant that there was no
“evidence that the horse’s conduct was anything other than ordinary equine behavior. . . .”
33
The significance of the general standard of conduct provided by an equine statute is that
profitable businesses may be shielded from liability for conduct that Good Samaritans remain
liable for.  In Georgia, an equine sponsor engaged in a profit-making business activity can escape
liability for gross negligence involving the inherent risks of equine activities,  yet a Good
345
Samaritan physician who attempts to rescue an unfortunate accident victim may not be excused if
the physician was grossly negligent.   Moreover, a physician on call remains liable for ordinary
35
negligence.  While policy reasons and distinctions between the activities addressed by these
separate statutes may justify such results, they are surprising. 
B.  A Suitability Standard for Equine Providers
The enumerated general standard of conduct  of the equine statute does not excuse
36
negligence or gross negligence in all instances.  If the defendant has provided the animal to an
injured plaintiff, the general standard evaluated in Muller may be superseded by a statutory
suitability standard.   The suitability standard provides that a person providing an equine who
37
fails “to make reasonable and prudent efforts” is not entitled to the statutory immunity.
The suitability standard enables a plaintiff-participant to maintain an action against a
defendant-provider of an equine if any one of three fundamental allegations is raised by
appropriate pleadings.  Under the first category, an inquiry of the participant’s ability must have
been made by the provider of the equine.  An allegation that the defendant-provider failed to
employ reasonable and prudent efforts to inquire of the participant’s ability to safely engage in
equine activities would raise a triable issue.  The second category involves allegations that the
provider negligently failed to use the information gained through the inquiry to determine the
participant's ability to engage safely in the equine activity.  A third category of allegations involves
failure of the provider to determine the participant’s ability to safely manage the selected equine. 
If the facts support an allegation within one of these categories, they would frustrate the statutory
immunity and preclude summary judgment for a defendant.6
C.  The Change in Liability by the Equine Statute
To discern the effect of the Georgia equine statute, its provisions may be applied to the
facts of the Jones v. Walker  case, a case decided prior to the adoption of the new legislative
38
directives.  In Jones, a court found evidence of possible negligence so that summary judgment
was not appropriate for one defendant, Mrs. Walker.  A horse owned by Mrs. Walker had
collided with another horse being ridden by a minor, the plaintiffs’ daughter.  The collision
occurred in a crowded warm-up ring, causing a severe injury to the daughter.  The court noted
that Mrs. Walker had experience with horses and horse shows and, thus, had knowledge that the
crowded warm-up ring was dangerous.  Since Mrs. Walker did not remove her horse and rider
from the crowded ring, there was a possibility that she was negligent.
If the Jones mishap had occurred after the adoption of the equine statute, the result should
be different.  Mrs. Walker may raise as a defense the statutory immunity, and this defense should
provide immunity unless an exception disqualifies her.  As the plaintiffs’ injured daughter was not
riding a horse provided by Mrs. Walker, the exceptions for faulty tack or the suitability standard
would not apply.  Nor did Mrs. Walker have a relationship with the premises or commit an
intentional act to cause the injury.  The only possible exception involves whether Mrs. Walker
breached the statutory general standard of conduct; did she commit an act or omission that
constituted willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the injured daughter?  The plaintiffs’
allegation of “direct negligence” seems insufficient to raise an issue under this statutory general
standard.  As noted by the Muller court, intent to inflict injury or recklessness is required to
thwart the immunity offered by the equine statute.   Mrs. Jones, as the owner but not the rider of
397
the horse involved in the collision with the injured daughter, did not engage in any intentional or
reckless conduct.
40
The meaning of the suitability standard may be seen by changing the facts of the Jones
case.  In Jones, the plaintiffs’ injured daughter was on a horse owned by a third party rather than
defendant Mrs. Walker.  Replace this fact with the assumption that the injured daughter was on a
horse provided by defendant Mrs. Walker and that the mishap occurred after enactment of the
Georgia equine statute.   Because Mrs. Walker provided the animal to the plaintiff-rider, the
41
suitability standard may be employed to perfect a cause of action.  An allegation that the
defendant should have removed her horse and the injured-rider from the crowded warm-up ring
raises an issue of whether the defendant failed to determine the rider's ability to engage safely in
the warm-up ring.  Under the second category of the suitability standard, such an allegation
should be found to present a triable issue.  Due to the more direct relationship, equine owners and
professionals remain liable for their negligence when they provide animals to a participant.
The analyses of the Muller and Jones cases support a conclusion that the equine statute
alters Georgia’s negligence law as it applies to injuries arising from some equine activities.  As
defined by the statute, immunity is granted for injuries resulting from the inherent risks of the
activity.  The thrust of the equine statute is to limit the liability of defendants who have
insubstantial contacts with an injury and the injury was due to an inherent risk of equine activities. 
Substantial contact with an injury involves the statutory obligations set forth for persons providing
animals, whereas insubstantial contact generally refers to situations where the defendant did not
provide the animal connected to the injury.  The Jones case discloses an injury involving
insubstantial contact.  Mrs. Walker, the defendant in Jones, had not supplied the horse ridden by8
the plaintiff’s injured daughter and her horse was being ridden by a third party.  Thereby, Mrs.
Walker was not able to prevent the collision of her horse with the horse being ridden by the
injured daughter, and there was no direct contact between Mrs. Walker and the injury.  Rather,
the injured daughter and her parents chose to accept the risk of a collision when the daughter was
permitted to ride in the crowded ring.
Turning to the issue of an inherent risk, the Muller case involved a horse ridden by Mr.
Muller that placed the kick injuring the plaintiff.  Because a kicking horse is ordinary equine
behavior during a fox hunt, it is an inherent risk. Under the Georgia equine statute, Mr. Muller
could raise the statutory defense and qualify for immunity from the injuries.  The Jones and
Muller cases suggest that the statutory grant of immunity will defeat allegations of negligence and
gross negligence only for sponsors and owners who have some type of attenuated relationship to
the injury and the plaintiff. 
III.  Safety Prerequisites
Equine activity sponsors and equine professionals are required by the Georgia equine
statute to post warning signs and use written warning notices before they qualify for statutory
immunity.   The statutory warning notice requirement mandates that sponsors and professionals
42
post warning notice signs at visible locations near areas where the equine activities are conducted,
stating:
WARNING:
Under Georgia law, an equine activity sponsor or equine professional is not liable for an
injury to or the death of a participant in equine activities resulting from the inherent risks
of equine activities, pursuant to Chapter 12 of Title 4 of the Official Code of Georgia.
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Failure of sponsors or professionals to meet the general warning notice requirement prevents them
from qualifying for statutory immunity.  For written contracts involving professional services and
rental of equipment, sponsors and professionals also must provide a warning that is clearly
readable.  Signs and written notices providing warning may be expected to lead participants to use
greater care while enjoying their equine activities.
While such warning provisions should be applauded, the question that should be addressed
is whether these notice provisions are sufficient safety prerequisites given current information and
knowledge about injuries from equine activities.   The equine statute was intended to reduce
44
insurance and liability costs associated with animal mishaps so that the reduction of injuries is
important.  Data on equine accidents suggest that head injuries are particularly dangerous,  and
45
that the low level of use of protective headgear among equestrian riders is a major factor to the
injuries.   Moreover, standards developed by the American Society for Testing Materials and
46
certification by the Safety Equipment Institute provide information that may be used for the
selection of appropriate equestrian headgear.
The United States Pony Clubs Accident Study suggests that the use of approved headgear
has reduced head injuries of its riders by more than 50 percent.   A safety program of the North
47
American Horsemen's Association (NAHA), developed for equine liability insurance, also attests
to the importance of helmets.   NAHA’s safety program requires that participants be advised to
48
wear helmets and, in some cases, a requirement that helmets be available.   Injury figures from
49
NAHA showed that only eight percent of its injury claims involved head injuries for persons
insured under its programs, as opposed to 21%-22% for the industry as a whole.   More recently,
50
NAHA has been more exacting in its requirement for protective headgear, requiring a Safety10
Equipment Institute certified American Society for Testing Materials standard F-1163 equestrian
riding helmet.
51
A.  Encouraging the Use of a Helmet
Given reported data, equine riders need to be encouraged to wear helmets.  This might be
effected through a prerequisite in the warning signs and contract provisions of the equine statute
that requires equine sponsors and professionals to advocate the use of a helmet.   By that,
52
subsection 4-12-4(b) would read (struck-out text is to be deleted, underlined text is proposed):
WARNING:
Under Georgia law, an to provide for safer activities, riders are encouraged to wear a
helmet.  An equine activity sponsor or equine professional is not liable for an injury to or
the death of a participant in equine activities resulting from the inherent risks of equine
activities, pursuant to Chapter 12 of Title 4 of the Official Code of Georgia.
Through this small amendment to the warning provision of the equine statute, riders may be more
likely to wear a helmet, and the equine statute could further the objective of safer equine
activities.
B.  Safety of Minors
Additional protection of young children may be warranted, as recognized by the General
Assembly in 1993 when bicycle helmet provisions for minors were enacted.   The bicycle helmet
53
provisions require persons under the age of 16 to wear a helmet on highways, bicycle paths, and
sidewalks.   Violation of this provision, however, is not evidence of negligence and shall not be
54
considered as evidence of negligence or liability.
5511
Why should young equine riders be afforded less protection from head injuries than bicycle
riders?  This difference could be changed by amending the equine statute through the addition of a
new section 4-12-5 that incorporates helmet provisions for minors.  The suggested section, drawn
from the bicycle helmet provisions, could read:
  § 4-12-5.  Wearing a helmet for safe equine activities
(a)  No person under the age of 16 years shall ride an equine on property that is being
made available for use by the general public without wearing a helmet.
(b)  For the purposes of this section, the term ‘helmet’ means a piece of protective
headgear which meets or exceeds the F-1163 impact standards for equestrian riding
helmets set by the American Society for Testing Materials as certified by the Safety
Equipment Institute.
(c)  For the purposes of this section, a person shall be deemed to wear a helmet only if a
helmet of good fit is fastened securely upon the head with the straps of the helmet.
(d)  Violation of any provision of this section shall not constitute negligence per se nor
contributory negligence per se or be considered evidence of negligence or liability.  No
person under the age of 16 failing to comply with any provision of this section may be
fined or imprisoned.
These suggested provisions would help reduce head injuries to minors and contribute to a safer
recreational activity.  Following the bicycle provisions, minors on qualifying private property
would not be obligated to wear a helmet.
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V.  Conclusion
The Georgia equine statute is a novel approach to the risks and accident costs associated
with equine mishaps.  It provides Good Samaritan immunity for qualifying situations to alter
existing negligence law.  Under a general standard of conduct, a person who commits an act or
omission that constitutes willful or wanton disregard for the safety of a participant does not12
qualify for statutory immunity.  Exceptions denote situations in which equine owners and
sponsors may be liable for negligence.  A suitability standard requires persons providing equines
to use reasonable and prudent efforts in determining the ability of the participant.
While legislatures should be hesitant to alter existing liability provisions, especially when
championed by a narrow special interest group, a more important issue is harmony among the
state’s divergent legislative provisions.  What standards of conduct have been found appropriate
for various activities by the General Assembly?  Existing Good Samaritan and other legislative
provisions provide responses to this question, with at least three delineating standards of conduct
similar to the equine provisions.   Thus, it may be concluded that the equine statute agrees with
57
existing legislation.
The equine statute grants qualifying persons immunity without a donation or special
benevolence.  Looking at other Georgia good Samaritan statutes, this departure from the
traditional good Samaritan paradigm is not unusual.  Moreover, statutory qualifications limit the
immunity to a narrow category of acts and omissions resulting from the inherent risks of equine
activities.  It may be concluded that defendants who have engaged in egregious conduct will not
escape liability due to the immunity provided by the equine statute.
A major public policy concern is whether the special dispensation afforded by the equine
statute is accompanied by appropriate encouragement of safety features.  This article responds to
this need by proposing the amendment of the statutory warning requirements to include language
encouraging the use of a helmet.  Yet, as submitted by an earlier analysis, a warning by itself may
be insufficient.  A more definitive requirement may be advisable in some cases and primary
responsibility needs to be placed with participants.13
A second recommendation is a new statutory section modeled after the Georgia bicycle
helmet provisions to afford minors riding horses the same safeguards against head injuries as
minors riding bicycles.  Recognizing that persons engaging in equine activities need to take
greater responsibility in taking appropriate precaution, this proposal assigns responsibility to
participants and their parents.  The suggested statutory provisions would require minors to wear
equestrian helmets when riding on property used by the general public.  In this manner, Georgia
could provide young horseback riders a safer recreational activity.14
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